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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
'YEYHEH CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
COX CONSTRUCTION COMPA-
NY, INC., and UNITED STATES 
FIDELITY AND GUARANTY 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
ll353 
RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants in their Statement of Facts have selected 
particular exhibits, portions of the testimony and sum-
maries of evidence, most favorable to the appellants' 
contentions, rather than stating the facts, as they must 
be viewed on appeal, objectively supporting the Ver-
dict and Findings. Thus the following corrections must 
be noted. 
1 
1. Contrary to the statements on pages 5 and 0 of 
appellants' Brief the sequence of the events concerning 
the agreements between Cox and Western Steel and 
Cox and "\V eyher occurred as follows: 
(a) The Prime Contractor bids were opened 
by the State Road Commission December 21 and 
Cox was the low bidder (Ex. 51 ) . 
( b) Sometime prior to December 23 represen-
tatives of Western Steel Company contacted Cox 
about the steel. They arrived at a verbal under· 
standing on or about December 23 that Western 
would receive the order for structural steel for the 
project. (R. 223, Ex. 36) The terms of delivery 
of the steel had been requested by Mr. Cox and 
were placed in the Proposal. (R. 225) The sched-
uling and final completion date for the steel work 
under the Proposal were determined after nego· 
tiations with Mr. Cox. (R. 227) 
( c) On December 27 Western Steel ordered 
some of the steel items from Bethlehem Steel Com· 
pany. ( R. 223, Ex. 37) 
( d) On January 6 Cox was notified of the 
award of the Prime Contract with the State. (Ex. 
64, R. 357) The steel was to have been furnished 
and installed by 'Vestern Steel by June 30, 1966 
(Ex. 36) 
( e) On January IO in the evening, Robert Y 
· t' te 'Veyher met with _M.:r. Cox at Manti to nego 1a 
2 
the \V eyher subcontract. At that time W eyher 
was informed that Cox had already entered into 
a contract with Western Steel and that he had 
ordered the steel from them on January 10 in his 
office at .Manti. (R. 81) Weyher informed Cox 
that he couldn't finish on June 30 if the steel was 
also being finished on June 30, since \V eyher' s 
work would have to be performed after \Vestern 
Steel Company had finished. (R. 81-84) Cox there-
upon stated that he had already ordered the steel 
from \Vestern Steel but that he wanted Mr. Wey-
her to coordinate and schedule it. ~Ir. Cox also 
stated that he had already told Western Steel of 
the sequence in which he wanted the steel installed. 
(R. 271-27 4) 
(f) Cox and Weyher jointly phoned Western 
Steelat thattime to see if the steel could be delivered 
earlier. No assurance was given that it could, but 
that an effort would be made to have it delivered 
earlier. (R. 272, Ex. 46) The Weyher subcontract 
had already been typed up and prepared for Mr. 
\V eyher' s signature before he arrived on January 
10. It was then signed. (R. 269, Ex. 2) 
(g) Thereafter on March 2, 1966, in response 
to a request from Ron Cox and to a letter from 
Cox dated February 16, 1966, Western Steel sub-
mitted a revised schedule of deliveries indicating 
that fabrication would be completed by the end 
of June. ( R. 225, Ex. 22) A copy of this letter 
3 
was sent to 'Veyher, since by this time 'Veyher 
had contacted 'Vestern Steel several times relating 
to scheduling the steel onto the project. 'Veyher 
objected to this rescheduling by letter <lated .March 
4, (Ex. 23) wherein he informed Cox of the fact 
that this would delay the project. 
( h) On January 11 Western Steel had re-
ceived back the signed agreement between Western 
and Cox and indicated in an interoffice memo-
randmn that the steel would have to be delivered 
by June 15 is possible. (R. 235, Ex. 46). 
(i) The March 2 letter indicates a mill sched· 
ule shipment date, which places final installation 
later than .June 30. (Ex. 22) 
2. The W eyher subcontract required W eyher to 
commence January 15 and complete by June 30. (Ex. 
2) Cox received a notice from the State dated January 
12 requiring it to commence work by January 22, 
(R. 47, Ex. 12, 13) and Cox did not commence work 
until January 21, 1966. (R. 47) 
3. Contrary to pages 7 and 8 of the appellants' 
Brief, steps 9, 10, 11 and 12 did not follow the form-
ing and pouring of the concrete work. Cox began laying 
gravel in April and extended it throughout the entire 
project until late August. (R. 457-459, Ex. 69, Ex. 
l) The asphalting began in July and extended through· 
out August, September and October. (Ex. 69) Cox 
in bidding the project did not have any particular order 
4 
for undertaking his work and had no schedule. (R. 
355-3.56 (Steps 5, 6, 7 and 8 set forth on pages 7 and 
ti of appellants' Brief, commencing with the erection 
of steel by Western Steel on May 28 were completed 
with the final placing of the curb and parapet on Oc-
tober 7. ( R. 106-110, Ex. 28) 'l'he steps 1 through 8, 
however, were necessary in the order shown. These 
steps beginning with finishing the pile cut-off by Ray-
mond Concrete Pile Co. and extending through final 
exca\'ation to the placing of concrete column caps began 
February 15 and extended through March 22. \Veyher 
was not able to commence its first work of forming 
until February 15. (R. 101-106, Ex. 27) 
4. The \V estern Steel structural steel had to be 
fabricated and thereafter erected on the project before 
the State Road Commission could establish the final 
finish grade. \V eyher could not commence its work until 
these two steps had been completed on any particular 
structure. (Ex. 28, R. 107) Western Steel began de-
lirery of its steel to the project on the westbound 14th 
Street railroad structure on May 24 and delivered its 
last steel to the project at Forest Street structure 
over I-15 on August 18. (Exs. 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 
H) The steel was erected in place beginning on the 
14th Street westbound railroad bridge on June 20 and 
on the last of the six bridges at Forest Street on August 
29. (Ex. 28) After sending the .March 2 letter, Western 
Steel had no further complaint from Cox (R. 227) 
11ntil August 9 at which time Cox notified \V estern 
Steel it was in default under its contract. (Ex. 38, 
5 
R. 231) On December 8, 1967, Cox paid the final reten-
tion to 'Vestern Steel, except for a partial payment 
still owing. (Ex. 45) 
5. After 'Vestern Steel and Cox had consummated 
their agreement, "r estern became aware of "r eyher 
as a subcontractor. ( R. 234) and received calls from 
'Veyher from time to time relative to expected <lelivery 
dates of different items of steel. These contacts related 
to coordination. (R. 244) Had the steel been delivered 
on time, 1Veyher would have been able to finish. How-
ever, the failure to deliver and install the steel prevented 
him from working. Even after the steel came, the 
1V eyher performance extended over a longer period of 
time than was anticipated because the steel delinry 
was spread out over a substantially longer period of 
time than should have been the case. It began May 
24 and was finally delfrered August 24 and finally 
erected on August 29. ( R. 88, 89, Ex. 28) The con-
tracting for and ordering of the steel had already been 
done by Cox so that 'Veyher had no opportunity to 
do any of this ordering. (R. 279, 281, Ex. 22) (R. 2!2) 
(R. 222, 234, Ex. 36) 
6. Contrarv to the statements at pages 9 and JO, 
Cox, when he bid the job to the State, had no definite 
idea about when the asphalt or gravel was going to be 
placed in surfacing the roadway. (R. 355, 356) At 
the time be entered into the subcontracts with "' erher. 
'Vestern Steel and Gilmore, he did not know when 
the project would start since he had not received the 
6 
notice to proced from the State. ( R. 360) l\'lr. Cox had 
no schedule of how the work was going to proceed. 
(R. :361) The only dates were those to which he held 
Western Steel and Gilmore Steel to complete their 
work, to""wit: June 30. (R. 362, 363) Contrary to 
appellants' argument at page 10 of their Brief, Cox 
commenced his work on the surfacing without regard 
to the degree of completion of any of the structures. 
He began laying gravel on 14th Street in April before 
the first steel was even delivered to the job site, (R. 457, 
Ex. 6) and continued until the last of August. The 
gravel was placed first on April 1, along the Inter-
state portion; in early June along 14th Street begin-
ning at the east end where it intersects with Highway 
89 and moving on '¥est; ( R. 455) in July and on into 
August on 14th Street, on the D-line at Forest Street 
and along the R-line at Highway 30 where it goes 
under the Freeway. (Ex. 6) The asphalt commenced 
about July 11 (R. 461) on the Interstate and worked 
on through July 29 and August 17 through 19 it was 
placed up and down 14th Street south; then August 
8 through August 28 the main portions of the Interstate 
were surfaced and around August 24 the ramps and 
bridge approaches were surfaced. (R. 461-463, Ex. 
72) Cox did not have to come back to the project but 
was at the project at all times. It was not necessary to 
leave space one to two hundred feet on either side of 
the structures. (R. 503) The bridge construction had 
no effect on the asphalt at 14th Street and Highway 
89 and Cox performed this work later on in the project. 
7 
He did not have to come back because he was la · 
. 'Ying 
all the other material at this time. (R. 518, 519). The 
Forest Street approaches were performed by Fife bu[ 
they included substantially more than just the short 
distance on either side of the structure. ( R. 486) Cox's 
main asphalting operation was carried on during J ulr 
and August and during this time he was workin~ 
throughout the project on all phases of it both graveling 
and asphalting. ( Exs. 12, 13, and 69) ( R. 495-503, 
Exs. 71-72) 
7. There were no extra costs incurred by Cox due 
to delays in completing its work. Having started in 
April Mr. Cox worked on through the project when· 
ever his equipment was on the project. (Exs. 6, 71, 72) 
8. Contrary to the last statement on page 12 relat· 
ing to the notice of claim, notice was given of the claim 
because of the structural steel problem. (Exs. 16, 17, 
18, 22, 23 and 48) (R. 261) Article 16 of the subcon· 
tract does not relate to any delays but only those delays , 
by the owner's agent suspending the prosecution of the · 
work. (Ex. 2) 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants in their Brief raise two general ques· 
tions: (a) Was the evidence sufficient to support the 
Court's Findings of Fact and the jury's answers to the 
Special Interrogatories; and (b) did the Court com· . 
· · · th I t t' ns l The · mit prejudicial error 111 g1vmg e ns rue 10 · 
8 
above questions relate to the award of damages for de-
lays and will be discussed in the above sequence. 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW. 
The evidence must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury's answers. Burkhalter v. Gran-
deur Homes, 17 Utah 2d 278, 409 P. 2d 614; Smith v. 
Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P. 2d 570; and Gordon 
v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P. 2d 430. As stated 
by the Court in Gordon, it will not disturb the jury's 
finding, 
"So long as it is supported by substantial evi-
dence, that is evidence which, together with the 
fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom, 
reasonable minds could conclude as the jury 
did .... " 
As indicated in preface to respondent's Statement 
of Facts, appellants have not presented the evidence 
in an objective manner but have picked out portions of 
the testimony and evidence most favorable to appel-
lants' position. Therefore, with reference to the par-
ticular findings questioned by appellants beginning on 
page 25 of appellants' Brief the following comments 
are submitted to show there is sufficient evidence to 
support the verdict and Findings of Fact. Since appel-
lants have taken excerpts from some of the Findings, 
9 
and attacked them piecemeal, appellants' questioned 
Findings will be considered under the complete finding 
designated by paragraph number. 
A. FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 2 IS SUP. , 
PORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL En. 
DENCE. 
I. 
Appellants claim, at page 25 of their Brief, that 
the following finding is not supported by the evidence. 
"That Cox entered into a contract with \Vest-
ern Steel Company on January 10, 1966, after ! 
having ordered certain structural steel from ' 
Western Steel prior thereto ... " 
On December 23, 1965 Western Steel submitted , 
its Proposal and Agreement to furnish the steel on the 
project. (R. 222, Ex. 36) Mr. Howard Jensen testi- , 
fied in connection with this Proposal as follows: 
"Q. Going back to December, 1965, about De-
cember 23, did you have any contact with Cox 
after you sent this proposal to him? 
A. Our fabricated sales engineer, Mr. Lew 
Kimball, had contact with Mr. Cox in bringing 
this to a conclusion. 
Q. At about in December of '65 did you haYe 1 
occasion to undertake any orders or obtain an)' 
orders or send any orders with reference to steel 
on your proposal? 
A. Well, at the time we made up this proposal 
on December 23, I think we had a verbal under· 
standing that we would be awarded this job anrl 
10 
that we would proceed on it, and I believe it was 
on December 27 when we entered an order with 
Bethlehem Steel Company for some of the more 
critical items as far as delivery is concerned, to 
get this project underway. I think we had con-
tacted them and found out what some of their 
rollings on steel were and decided it was urgent 
that we enter and order as soon as possible to ob-
tain a booking on their orders in their mill." (R. 
222 and 223) 
"Q. Now, Mr. Jensen, after you had this con-
tract with Cox when did you first have any sched-
ule of the delivery of the steel to the project made 
up? 
A. Well, we had been asked by Mr. Cox to 
meet a certain schedule that he desired to meet 
on his project, and I think that the terms of that 
were substantially put into this proposal." (R. 
225) 
' An order was given to Bethlehem Steel for some of 
the items, December 27. (R. 224, Ex. 37) 
On January IO, in the evening, when Robert Wey-
her and Cecil Cox met to discuss the signing of the Cox-
Weyher subcontract. This conversation occurred: 
"Q. Did you have any discussion at that time 
with him with reference to ordering this steel? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you give us that conversation? 
A. Well, when I arrived Mr. Cox had the sub-
contract, which we both signed, for the work on 
the concrete work, prepared. He prepared it in 
11 
his office, I presume. At least he had it prepared 
to submit to me for my signature, and as I re-
viewed it I noted the provision in there in regard1 
to the steel, and as I was not buying the steel nor 
did I know what arrangements had been made 
with either of the steel suppliers, Gilmore Steel 
for the reinforcing steel or \Vestern Steel for the 
structural steel, I inquired of him as to what 
arrangements and with whom he had made these 
arrangements. 
Q. And what did he say? 
A. And Mr. Cox told me that there were agree-
ments with both of these steel suppliers for the 
furnishing and erection of the steel and he would 
handle that item, he would pay for it, he would 
buy it from them, and that they would have 1t 
there in sufficient time for me to do my work. 
But he merely wanted me to schedule and co· 
ordinate the delivery of the steel so that when we 
were in need of it the steel contractors, both Gil· 
more and 'Vestern, would have sufficient notice 
so that they could get it to the job on time so we 
wouldn't lose any time." (R. 81 and 82) 
On cross examination Mr. \V eyher stated: 
"Q. All right now, what else was included in 
the discussion? 
A. We talked about the contract that Mr. Cox 
told me he had with 'Vestern Steel for the de· 
livery of the structural steel. 
Q. As a matter of fact he told you that ~e h~d 
a bid proposal from them and let you see 1t, did 
he not? 
A. No, that's not my recollection. 
12 
Q. Didn't he tell you that he was not going to 
let this subcontract to you unless you would take 
the responsibility for the delivery of the struc-
tural steel? 
A. He certainly did not. 
Q. And didn't you call Mr. Kimball of West-
ern Steel to confirm the delivery? 
A. Mr. Cox and I both called Western Steel." 
( R. 271 and 272) 
* * * 
"Q. We'll get into your recollection on that in 
a few minutes. Now you say that it is not your 
recollection that Cox told you that he would not 
let this subcontract to you unless you would agree 
to be responsible for the delivery of the structural 
steel? 
A. Well, I certainly did not agree. I agreed to 
coordinate the scheduling of the structural steel 
and the reinforcing steel, and that I did." (R. 
273) 
* * * 
"Q. And what was the occasion then for your 
calling Mr. Kimball? 
A. Because Mr. Cox told me that he'd entered 
into a contract with Western Steel and that they 
had agreed to get it all there by June 30. 
Q. Isn't it a fact that Cox told you he would not 
buy that steel from Western Steel until you had 
entered info the subcontract and agreed to take 
the responsibility? 
A. No, sir." (R. 274) 
* * * 
13 
"Q. As a matter of fact, Mr. W eyher, you : 
agreed to take the responsibility for the delivery 
from \Vestern Steel, and that's why you called 
Kimball ; isn't that a fact ? 
A. No. l agreed to schedule and coordinate de. 
livery so that it would fit in with the concrete 
work. 
Q. And why did you call Kimball? 
A. Well, I started to tell you and I'll try again. 
I called Mr. Kimball - Mr. Cox and I both 
called him. 
Q. Do you remember that? You were both on 
two phones? 
A. I don't know whether I was on the phone 
all of the time alone or whether Mr. Cox was on 
the phone part of the time with me or whether 
Mr. Cox was not on the phone at all. I do recall 
that later Mr. Lew Kimball, who we called, made 
a note that said that both of us called him." (R 
274 and 275) 
Again in answer to a question of l\'lr. Piercey regarding 
the subcontract Mr. W eyher testified, 
"Q. Yes, and that says more than scheduling, ' 
doesn't it? It says, 'responsible for ordering the 
steel and making sure it gets there on time so as 
not to delay the subcontractor's performance.' ' 
A. Well, in your interpretation it becomes an 
impossible condition, because it was already or· 
dered by somebody else." (R. 279) 
Mr. Cox, in discussing the \Vestern Steel com· 
pletion date, testified: 
14 
"Q. RighU Then so far as Western Steel is 
concerned, how did you fix the time that Western 
Steel was to perform? According to their agree-
ment also? 
A. No, I told Western Steel that they had to 
be through with their work by June 30. 
Q. You didn't have any beginning date for 
Western Steel? 
A. I don't think it showed a beginning date. 
They just had to have their work done. They had 
to have the supplies in on the job and finished 
by a certain time. 
Q. By June 30? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And that was the important date so far as 
'" estern Steel was concerned, June 30; is that 
correct? 
A. Well, I don't know what they call impor-
tant dates. 
Q. Well, what did you call the important date? 
A. That was an important date for me." (R. 
362) 
Cox's statement to this effect is also found in the 
Western Steel Memorandum. (R. 235, Ex. 46) There 
would seem therefore substantial evidence to support 
the finding that sometime prior to January 10 Cox 
and \V estern Steel had an arrangement sufficiently 
solid to warrant Western Steel ordering from Beth-
lehem Steel. There is also sufficient evidence to show 
that prior to the signing of the Cox-W eyher Subcon-
15 
I 
I 
tract, Cox had already entered into his agreement with [ 
Western Steel; that W eyher relied upon Cox through I 
\Vestern Steel to get the steel to the job site in time ; 
for W eyher to finish by June 30; and that \Veyhei ' 
would not have signed and thus bound himself under 
the subcontract to finish by June 30 if that had not ' 
been the case. It is not reasonable to infer from these 
facts that Cox, having made the arrangements with 
Western Steel as to June 30, completion date, and 
then claiming to leave everything up to W eyher, would 
nevertheless have signed the Western Steel agreement 
after signing W eyher' s agreement. There could be no re-
liance upon W eyher in that respect since W eyher could 
not do his work until Western Steel's work was fin-
ished. The reliance claimed by Cox works backwards 
and is without reason. 
2. 
Appellants claim at page 26 of their Brief that 
there is no evidence to support the finding, 
'' ... that thereafter on or about March 2, 1966, 
\Vestern Steel Company and Cox without Wey-
her' s consent modified the said steel agreement 
... and did further modify the schedule of fabri;, 
cation, delivery and installation of the steel · · · 
After negotiations in December, between Western 
Steel and Cox, resulting in the informal agreement 
between them and the ordering of some preliminarv 
items of steel, the delivering and scheduling of the 
items had been agreed to. Thereafter on January IO 
16 
Cox affixed liis signature to the Proposal to which he 
Jia<l previously agreed and to which he had previousiy 
ad<leJ some typed agreements. Thereafter a letter was 
sent from \Vestern Steel to Cox dated March 2, (Ex. 
2~) concerning which .Mr. Howard Jensen of Western 
Steel testified as follows: 
"Q. N °''"• Mr. Jensen, after you had this con-
tract with Cox when did you first have any sched-
ule of the delivery of the steel to the project made 
up? 
A. Well, we had been asked by Mr. Cox to 
meet a certain schedule that he desired to meet 
on his project, and I think that the terms of that 
were substantially put into this proposal. 
Q. After you had entered into this proposal 
then did you have occasion to communicate with 
Cox regarding the scheduling of the steel 1 
A. At at later period I think Ronnie Cox had 
gotten in touch with us regarding scheduling, 
and I believe - well, now, there's a letter that I 
wrote to him in response to his call to us. I pre-
sume that's the one you have. 
Q. I'll show you what's been marked in this 
case heretofore as exhibit 22, which is a copy of 
a letter dated March 2, addressed to Cox from 
"\V estern Steel, and ask you if you can identify 
that for us. 
A. That's the letter that was written on March 
second when we outlined to him what kind of 
commitments we felt we had on the mills for de-
liYery of steel, and where we told him the order in 
which we had understood that these were to be 
delivered, and -" (R. 225 and 226, Ex. 22) 
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Mr. Jensen further testified in answer to Mr 
Piercey's question about whether 'iV eyher, later on: 
had contacted him to expedite the Forest Street bridge: 
"A. I can't remember if he did, but if he'd done 
rd have had to tell him it was in vain, because we 
had this absolutely scheduled, our shipments from 
the mill in a certain order, and I think we at the 
beginning of this job made a statement that after 
we set the schedule up it would have to be fol-
lowed." (R. 239) 
3. 
Appellants claim at page 29 of their Brief that 
there is no evidence to support the finding: 
". . . that Cox was informed of the modified 
delivery and fabrication schedule by \Vestern 
Steel and made no objection thereto thus agree-
ing to and permitting the steel to be delivered 
and erected subsequent to June 30, 1966 .... " 
The letter from Western Steel to Cox is not only 
in response to inquiries from Ronnie Cox (R. 225) 
but was in response to a letter from Cox dated Feb· 
ruary 16, which letter is mentioned in the first line. 
(Ex. 22) Thus the evidence is simply this: In response 
to a request from Cox orally made and in further re-
sponse to a written request of February 16, both re-
quests following on the heels of the execution of the 
agreement between Western Steel and Cox, Western 
Steel in compliance with the request sets forth its 
schedule for mill deliveries of the steel for the different 
portions of the project. Mr. Jensen of Western Steel 
testified: 
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"Q. Now I notice that - let's see. The sched-
ule that appears on this letter of March 2, 1966, 
indicates the order of delivery to different bridges 
on the project. As I understand, that was pur-
suant to a request of Cox, is that true? 
A. I think when we first negotiated this con-
tract we decided the order of delivery. I can't 
remember whether that was - whether the order 
of delivery was made at our suggestion. It seems 
to me it was. We told him it would be more con-
venient for us to get certain work out. But any-
way it was agreeable to the parties and it never 
became a question of controversy in here from 
then on, to the best of my knowledge." (R. 226 
and 227) 
It is reasonable to infer that Cox agreed to the 
new schedule. If not and if it intended to hold Western 
Steel to its original contract completion date, it would 
have made and should have made some objection to 
this new schedule. Just as reasonably we must assume 
that if Cox intended on holding Wey her to his June 30 
date, notwithstanding this change in steel schedule, 
there would have been some duty to respond to the 
March 2 letter. Just as obviously there should reason-
ably have been some duty on the part of Cox to respond 
to Weyher's letter of March 4, (Ex. 23) in which 
\Y eyher objected to this new schedule of Western Steel. 
The jury and the Court are both certainly entitled to 
reasonably infer that there was an agreement by Cox 
for the extension of the steel schedule and there was 
an agreeement or at least a recognition by Cox that 
Weyher would not be held to the June 30 date. 
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Appellants seem to contend that once Cox signer! 
the proposal and agreement with Western Steel he had 
no further responsibility or even any interest in the 
performance of \Vestern Steel. This does not appear 
to be reasonable when the following is considered: 
(a) The importance of scheduling the com· 
pletion of each subcontractor's work. (R. 362-36.f) 
(b) The contact by Ron Cox and the letter 
of February 16, inferentially asking for a com-
mitment on the delivery of the steel. ( R. 225-227, 
Ex. 22) 
( c) The letter dated August 9, 1966, ad-
dressed to Western Steel asking 'Vestern to spee<l 
up, which is in the same form as is a letter to Wey-
her Construction Company. ( Exs. 38 and 48) 
( d) The payment of $340,000.00 to Western 
Steel. (R. 368) 
( e) The payment on December 8, 1967, and 
letter of transmittal indicating the contractual 
relationship and concern of Cox. (Ex. 45) 
( f) The inclusion of Western Steel amongst 
the other subcontractors under a designation of 
specialty company in a letter requesting an increase 
in the prequalification. (Ex. 68, R. 450) 
(g) The obvious reference in a letter dated 
August 30 written to other subcontractors to keep 
ahead of the operation so as to not delay with the 
oiling. (Ex. 50) 
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ll. FINDINGS OF FACT NO. 3 IS SUP-
PORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE 
I. 
Appellants contend at page 30 that there is no evi-
dence to support the finding, 
"That Cox having ordered the steel and having 
agreed with Western Steel to the delayed sched-
ule made it impossible for W eyher to order the 
steel. ... " 
Appellants state at page 31, 
"It is uncontested that plaintiff knew at the 
time it signed the subcontract agreement with 
Cox that Cox was going to enter into a purchase 
agreement with Western Steel. ... " 
Such an alleged fact certainly is contested. At the time 
W eyher signed the Cox subcontract he had been in-
formed by Cox and knew that Cox had already entered 
into the agreement with Western Steel. This prior 
Western Steel agreement prompted W eyher and Cox 
to discuss the effect upon Weyher's work of the simul-
taneous completion dates of June 30 and resulted in 
a telephone call to Western Steel to see whether or not 
the delivery date could be accelerated. ( R. 81-84) It 
is obvious that the steel had already been ordered by 
Western Steel and W eyher could thus not do anything 
more than coordinate or schedule the steel. 
Mr. Weyher testified in response to questions by 
Mr. Piercey: 
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"Q. Now tell me what you did between J anu-
ary the tenth and May the 24th with lVestern 
Steel with respect to being responsible for order 
ing the steel and making sure the steel items will 
be taken care of in plenty of time so as not tu 
delay the contract. 
A. I didn't order it, because it was impossible. 
It had already been ordered by Mr. Cox. 
Q. Now, as a matter of fact it had not been 
ordered until concurrently with the signing of 
this subcontract; is that correct? 
A. You talked about January -
Q. The tenth. 
A. Until some future date, and surely it must 
have been ordered then, and I responded correct· 
ly I think. 
Q. All right, go ahead and tell me what you 
did with respect to ordering and making sure the 
steel items would be taken care of in plenty of 
time so as not to delay the contract. 
A. I didn't do anything in regard to the order· 
ing. 
Q. And you didn't do anything with regard to 
making sure they were delivered in time so as 
not to delay the contract either, I take it? 
A. Yes. I tried to schedule it and I urged them 
to hurry if they could, because I pointed out we 
needed to do our work, but I had no control over 
them, I had no contractual relationship with 
them. 
Q. But as a matter of fact you had assumed the 
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responsibility under this contract with Cox, had-
n't you? 
A. No, I had not." (R. 281 and 282) 
The coordinating and scheduling, however, was 
in turn rendered impossible by Western Steel's sched-
ule of March 2. (Ex. 22) W eyher did all it could to 
coordinate the placing of the steel which is the usual 
pattern followed in the construction of this type of 
work. \Veyher commenced attempting to coordinate 
the delivery of the steel after the Cox-Western Steel 
contract was consummated. (R. 234, 244, 263) 
It is highly improbable for a jury or court to assume 
that Cox would obligate itself with Western Steel for 
$340,000.00 upon an agreement to furnish and install 
steel by June 30, and have no responsibility thereunder. 
Neither the court or jury made such an unreasonable 
inference. 
2. 
Appellants claim at pages 31 and 32, that there is 
no evidence to support the fallowing: 
" ... that Cox interfered with Weyher's work 
and thus prevented \V eyher from performing un-
der the terms of the subcontract by June 30, 
1966 ... and that Cox had ordered the steel and 
by so ordering and agreeing to the new schedul-
ing interfered with and made it impossible for 
\V eyher to comply .... " 
The evidence in support of this finding has been 
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fairly adequately either summarized or set out in some 
detail heretofore. Again it should be noted, however: 
(a) Cox had, prior to his meeting with Wey. 
her, agreed with Wes tern Steel on the terms ~f 
the steel contract, including the June 30 date, 
had prepared and had typed thereon said terms 
for delivery of steel. 
( b) Cox had already prepared and typed rn 
the subcontract for "\-Veyher including page 11 
before W eyher met on the evening of January 10. 
( c) The ordering of the steel by Cox to be 
completed by June 30 had already occurred. 
( d) Because of the conflict in the two June · 
30 dates and also the Gilmore Steel June 30 date, 
they telephoned Western Steel to determine 
whether or not the June 30 completion date could 
be moved ahead by two weeks, and this possible 
acceleration of the ordering and delivery of the 
steel was indicated by Western Steel. 
( e) In reliance upon the very obvious fact 
that the steel had to be completed in sufficient 
time prior to his completion date for him to prop· 
erly do his work, W eyher undertook its subcou· 
tract agreement with Cox. 
Appellants persist throughout their Brief in erro· 
neously arguing upon the basis that the Cox-\Vestern 
Steel agreement was "going to be entered into" at the 
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time that \Veyher signed his subcontract and that the 
initial purchase from Western Steel constitutes the 
interference with Weyher's work. Such argument does 
not go to the actual question of interference. The inter-
fere nee arises out of the contract between Cox and 
Western Steel, it is true. However, it is based upon 
the subsequent failure of Cox and \V estern Steel to 
adhere to the original contract requirements and by 
modifying said original completion date of June 30 
through the March 2 letter (Ex. 22) and through sub-
sequent delays even beyond those contemplated in said 
letter. It is this interference which the jury and the 
Court reasonably infers is not the responsibility of 
Weyher but actually is under the primary responsibility 
of Cox, and which forced Weyher into the delay, extend-
ing into November. 
The provisions of the said contract upon which 
appellants rely in regard to the structural steel delay 
must be given meaning in the context of the entire sub-
contract agreement and in relationship to the circum-
stances surrounding the development of the delay. 
When Mr. Cox first took bids on these structures, he 
contemplated that a subcontractor M. Morrin & Sons 
would do the entire structure including furnishing of 
all steel. Under this concept, (R. 316) obviously such 
a paragraph would have materiality. And such a para-
graph had been typed up for signature prior to Mr. 
Weyher's arrival. However, since Mr. Weyher had 
not proposed to do the steel, and since Cox undertook 
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the steel work through Western, '" eyher very properlv 
questioned this paragraph, and particularly the co~­
pletion date of June 30. 
It is obvious that such a paragraph relates to the 
actual purchasing and contracting for the structural 
steel. That paragraph reasonably goes to the very terms 
which Cox believed were so important, i.e., the price 
and the completion date of June 30. (R. 364) There-
fore, at the time W eyher came into the picture the 
structual steel had already been purchased and ordered 
1 
and it was to be completed on that project by June 30. 
This work was part of the work which Cox had origi· 
nally contemplated that M. Morrin & Sons would do 
under a complete subcontract, including both steel and 1 
concrete. 
The only meaning which can be attached to the 
paragraph, if it has any meaning in view of the prior 1 
agreement between Cox and Western Steel, would be 
to coordinate the steel to the different and particular 
1 
portions of the contract work as those portions became 
available. This coordination, as W eyher and Jensen 
testified, is the ordinary type of coordination. However. 
such coordination obviously must be within the frame· 
work of the contract between the general contractor 
and the supplier, to-wit: Cox and Western. Even that ' 
type of coordinating and scheduling was taken away 
from W eyher by the March 2 letter from 'V estern 
Steel to Cox in which the detailed scheduling of the 
steel to the different portions of the contract work was 
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set out. The only thing left for \V eyher to do after 
tl1al was to continually call Western Steel to try to 
hurry up the delivery and installation of steel in an 
effort to determine at what point \V eyher could com-
mence the different operations on the different struc-
tures which followed installation of the steel. 
In other words, according to the strict wording 
of the subcontract paragraph in question, Weyher 
could not be responsible for ordering the steel and mak-
ing sure that the steel items were taken care if in view 
of the contract between Cox and Western Steel with 
the subsequent amendment to that contract which came 
into effect by the .March 2 letter and thereafter. Weyher 
did all he could to expedite the steel but as Exhibit 
22 shows and as Mr. Jensen testified (R. 239) : 
" ... it was in vain because we had this abso-
lutely scheduled, our shipments from the mill in 
a certain order, and I think we at the beginning 
of this job made a statement that after we set 
the schedule up it would have to be followed." 
The contract had already been established between 
Cox and \Vestern Steel and had already been modified 
by Cox and Western Steel, over W eyher' s objection. 
(Ex. 23) 
Both parties therefore knew at the time that 
Weyher entered into the subcontract with this provision 
included therein, that Cox had already purchased the 
steel, had already established the June 30 completion 
date of Western Steel, and by conference and joint 
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telephone call had determined that "\Vestern Steel would 
have the steel finished prior to that June 30 completion 
date. Thereafter on March 2, after W eyher had com- . 
menced the contract to subject W eyher to a modification 
in the structural steel delivery date over Weyher's 
objection and classifys it as Weyher's responsibilitv 
seems unreasonable to say the least. The evidence do;1 
not support such an inference and the jury was justified 
in finding to the contrary. The Court in Findings of 
Fact No. 3 properly determined that Cox had made 
it impossible for W eyher to comply with this provision ! 
of the subcontract. 
C. THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE 
1 
SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND 
ARE CORRECT UNDER THE LAW OF 
1 
THE CASE 
At pages 34 and 35 of their Brief, appellants argue 
that the Conclusion of Law No. I is not supported by 
the evidence. The facts supporting this conclusion have 
been set forth above by ref erring to different portions ' 
of the testimony and to the various exhibits. We have 
shown heretofore that there was substantial evidence 
to support the jury's verdict and the court's Findings ; 
of Fact to the effect that Cox interfered with the per· : 
formance of W eyher' s contract. The conclusion there· 
fore indicates the legal result caused by the interfer· 
ence. Such an interfernce gives rise to a cause of action 
on the part of Weyher. 
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"As a general rule, if a contractor agrees to do 
certain work within a specified time, and he is 
prevented from performing the contract by the 
act or default of the other party, or by the acts of 
persons for whose conduct the latter is respons-
ible, the delay thus occasioned is excused, and the 
contractor may not be held liable .... " 13 Am. 
J ur. 2d page 51. See also Peter Kiewit Sons 
Company v. Pasadena City Junior College Dis-
trict, 379 P. 2d 18 (Calif.) ; and the annotation 
at 16 ALR 3rd 1252. 
The Courts are in accord with the general prin-
ciple of law that a provision in a construction contract 
relieving a contractee from liability for delays is not 
applicable to delays caused by the conduct of the con-
tractee constituting active interference with the per-
formance of the contractor. See Psaty and Fuhrman 
t•.Housing Authority, 68 A. 2d 32 (R.I. 1949), anno-
tated in IO A.L.R. 2d page 805. The question of which 
party to a construction contract is responsible for a 
delay in completion is a question of fact for the deter-
mination of the trier of the facts. 13 Am. J ur. 2d page 
! 119. 
POINT II 
THE FINDING OF THE JURY THAT COX 
WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DELAY IN 
1 THE DELIVERY OF THE STRUCTURAL 
STEEL IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
The matters submitted to the jury in Question 1 
la), l (b) and 1 (c) involve the factual determination 
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as to why the delays occurred and whose responsibilih 
they were. The Court then applied said factual findin;, 
b 
to the contract provisions, as it had indicated it would 
throughout the trial, and supplemented the jury'i 
answers by its own findings. Thereafter Conclusions 
of Law were made applying the factual determinationi 
to the law of the case and, of course, to the contract 
document itself. 'J-'he instruction requested by appe]. 
lants to the effect that the subcontract provision shouhl 
have been given to the jury is unnecessary. The jury 
was well aware of the provisions of the subcontract. 
Throughout the record are found ample references 
thereto by witnesses, counsel and the Court. The appL· 
cation of the contract provisions to various legal de· 
fenses asserted by appellants was properly considered 
by the Court in making its own Findings of Fact. Con· 
clusions of Law and Judgment. 
POINT III 
IT WAS PROPER TO FIND THAT PLAIN· 
TIFF WAS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FOR 
DELAY IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,226.85 
The matters complained of by appellants under 
Point III involve the legal interpretation of the various 
contractual provisions and are not proper subject matter 
of instructions to the jury. The various contract articles 
are discussed below to indicate the lack of any legal 
effect upon the issues herein. 
30 
A .. ARTICLE IX - OTHER SUBCON-
TRACTS. 
Such a contractual provision is no defense to the 
contractor. "No damage" clauses are very often placed 
in construction contracts. However, if they are included 
m contracts, 
". . . they are construed strictly, because of 
the harsh results which may flow from their en-
forcement. A delay which extends for so long ;i, 
time that it may be regarded as an abandonment 
will subject the contractee to liability. Moreover, 
even though a particular delay may fall within 
the literal meaning of such a provision, the pro-
vision will not be enforced if the delay is a result 
of fraud or active interference on the part of the 
one seeking the benefit of the provision." (Em-
phasis added) 13 Am. Jur. 2d p. 55, 56. 
In this case the paragraph must be construed strictly. 
The paragraph does not excuse the contractor from 
responsibility for the acts or operations of itself, but 
only for the acts of other subcontractors or material 
suppliers. Thus strictly construed, the clause says 
nothing about delays or interferences by the Contractor. 
However, even if it did by its strict interpretation 
absolve the contractor from the responsibility for delay, 
nevertheless where Cox has actively agreed to and par-
ticipated in the cause of the delay, he cannot be per-
mitted to take advantage of this exculpatory clause. In 
discussing exculpatory clauses this Court in Union 
Pacific Railroad Company v. El Paso, 17 Utah 2d 255, 
408 P. 2d 910, has stated: 
31 
" ... th~t the 4}w does not look with favor up011 
one exactmg a covenant to relieve himself of the 
basic duty which the law imposes on everyone: 
that of using due care for the safety of himse]I 
and others." ' 
The Court also comments on some basic contract prin. 
ciples which should be considered in resolving a dispu!e 
about ~uch provisions in a contract. The Court said', 
"The first is that each party is entitled to as-
sume that the other intends to conduct himsell 
as a reasonable and prudent person would under 
whatever circumstances may thereafter arise, 
which presupposes that he will commit no wrong· 
ful act nor be guilty of negligence." 
This Court further indicates that the provisions must! 
be taken in context with the other provisions of the. 
subcontract. Certainly it cannot be considered to apply 
where the contractor, Cox, modified its subcontract 
with Western Steel. 
B. ARTICLE XIV - CLAIMS FOR EXTRA 
WORK OR DAMAGES 
The Court properly held that adequate notice of 
claims under this clause was given to Cox. As soon as 
W eyher learned that the Cox-Western Steel contract ' 
was being changed through the March 2 letter (Ex. 
22) W eyher within two days objected thereto and 
notified Cox of the delay. (Ex. 23) Thereafter on 
August 9 (Ex. 48) "\i\T eyher returned a Cox Construe· 
ti on Company letter noting on the bottom thereof' 
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"\Ve are on schedule, we have sufficient forces 
on the job to keep up with the erection of the 
structural steel which is being furnished and in-
stalled by you and is not a part of our contract. 
Delivery of this steel has materially delayed our 
work. The strike is June also caused some delay." 
This Court in Utah State Building Board v. W a"lsh 
Plurnbing, 16 Utah 2d 249, 399 P. 2d 141, held that 
the failure to give notice, where a contract requires 
notice is not fatal. 
"In this connection it should be kept in mind 
that where a contract such as this requires the 
giving a notice, unless the failure to give it in 
some way puts a party to a disadvantage or ad-
versely affects his rights, he should not be per-
mitted to evade his just obligations under the con-
tract because of a mere technical failure to give 
notice." 
C. ARTICLE XV - BASIS AND SCOPE OF 
PAYMENT. 
The application of this prov1s1on in the subcon-
tract has no factual foundation in the testimony what-
soever. There was never any contention made through-
out the trial that full and final payment of the contract 
price precluded the claim for damages. As a matter 
of fact, it is admitted that the contract price was never 
fully paid to W eyher. (Ex. 26, R. 97) In any event, 
eYen had full and final payment been made on the 
contract such payment does not preclude a suit for 
breach of contract. 
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D. ARTICLE XVI - DELAYS. 
Appellants have quoted this Article of the suo. 
contract out of context. A reading of the entire Artick 
shows that the delays referred to therein are tho~~ 
caused by the owner or owner's agent. The precedin~ 
portion of the Article, which appellants have not quoteu 
reads as fallows : 
.. 
"It is understood and agreed that the Subcon. 
tractor shall comply with the instructions given 
by the Owner or Owner's agent, including an:· · 
instructions requiring him to delay or suspend . 
the prosecution or completion of the work pro· 
vided for herein, and that the Subcontractor will 
not ... " 
It is obvious therefore that Article XVI has no 1 
application to the issues at hand. There is no contention : 
nor evidence to the effect that the owner-the State 
Road Commission ordered any suspension of work. 
POINT IV 
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
WERE PROPER 
Under Rule 49 the Court may submit to the jury 
written interrogatories and in so doing shall give to the 
jury such explanation and instruction concerning the 
matter as may be necessary to enable the jury to make 
its findings upon each issue. 
"If in so doing the Court omits any issue 01 
fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence. 
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each party waives his right to a trial by jury of 
the issues so omitted unless before the jury re-
tires he demands its submission to the jury. As to 
an issue omitted without such demand the Court 
may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall 
be deemed to have made a finding in accord with 
the judgment on a special Yerdict." (Rule 49 
URCP) 
The Court obviously submitted to the jury some 
\ery specific questions. All of the other questions con-
cerning issues of fact and issues of law were reserved 
and were made the subject of rather extensive Findings 
11f Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment entered by 
the Court. There was no attempt on the part of the 
Court or of counsel to attempt to submit to the jury 
all of the mixed questions of law and fact which may 
: have been implicit in the various defenses raised by each 
party. There was no demand made that all of the issues 
be submitted to the jury. 
This Court has stated in Robinson v. H reinson, 
17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P. 2d 121, that, 
"The parties have had what they were entitled 
to: a full and fair opportunity to present their 
contentions and the evidence supporting them to 
the Court and jury. When this has been done all 
presumptions are in favor of the validity of the 
verdict and judgment." 
Appellants claim that the instructions did not 
fairly present defendants' theory of the case to the jury. 
Both the plaintiff's claims and the defendants' claim on 
its Counterclaim are summarized by the Court in In-
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struction No. 5. Such a summary of the pleadings b · gr 
proper. Taylor v. Weber County, 4 Utah 2d 328, 2% 
P. 2d 925. The basic issue relating to delays is even]1 
and fairly set forth in the Instruction No. 1, questio1;, 
1 (a) , 1 ( b) and 1 ( c), without reference to names ul 
either party. There is a further Instruction No. l(A, 
which indicates the possible answers but in turn inrilt: 
counsel to discuss the respective theories of the ca~t 
The Instruction further invites the jury to ask que1. 
tions, if necessary. The Special Interrogatories begin· 
ning with No. 2 (a) relate to the particular damage 
claims being asserted by the plaintiff. Appellants rai~e 
no question as to the verdict of the jury or the findings 
of the Court relative to the Interrogatories No. !, : 
through No. 7 ( b) and the jury recommendations. Thui ! 
I 
there can be no prejudical error now claimed by appel· i 
lants in regard to those Interrogatories. 
Appellants claim prejudicial error in not giving : 
defendants' requested Instruction No. I. Defendants 
requested Instruction No. 1 is in effect a judgrnen\ 
in favor of defendants as a matter of law upon the 
theory that no evidence was adduced in favor of plain· 
tiff's case. As the record shows and as we have pointeJ 
out in this Brief there was substantial evidence to sup . 
port the jury's Verdict and the Court's Findings am! , 
Conclusions and Judgment. 
Appellants further complain that Instruction Nu 
2 should have been given. It is interesting to note tli( 
all inclusive manner in which appellants requested 3 
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Ill 
th 
lil 
II 
f: 
great number of instructions merely by reference to 
numbers under the JIFU. One must surely recognize 
that Judge Jones did not give the great number of 
instructions which many judges do give. However, 
the instructions when considered as a whole adequately 
inform the jury of the questions to be answered. The 
instructions further define the burden of proof and a 
fair preponderance of the evidence in Instruction No. 
~ (R. 612) There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the jury was misinformed or that it did not under-
stand its function in answering these questions. Counsel 
had ample opportunity to argue all phases of the case 
and, of course, did so. 
Whichever issues the jury did not decide the Court 
did decide in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment which were much more comprehensive 
than is the usual case where matters have been submitted 
to a jury. 
Specific mention is made by appellants of the In-
struction No. 5 as being demonstrative of the preju-
dicial presentation of the claims of the parties. It is 
obvious, however, that most of the claims in the lawsuit 
were those of the plaintiff and Instruction No. 5 merely 
listed the various claims and the amounts being sought 
thereunder. Said statement of the claims would appear 
to be more prejudicial to the plaintiff, in that it made 
no mention whatsoever of the contract moneys being 
withheld by Cox which contract moneys in the amount 
nf $26,000.00 were a substantial item in the plaintiff's 
case. 
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"The question here involved is whether tti 
case was presented to the jury in such a mann t 
that it is rea~onable to believe that the parties h:J' 
an opportumty to present their evidence and hai·e 
a fair and impartial trial by the Court and jurr 
~~ that r~sult has been accomplished irregula;. 
1hes or mmor errors should be disregarded. }{e. 
versal of a judgment is justified only when tlitn 
is some error of such a substantial nature that 
there is a likelihood that the result would hare 
been different in its absence." Eager v. Willi.i 
17 Utah 2d 314, 410 P. 2d 1003. . 
The comprehensive coverage of this case by botn 
1 
parties cannot be questioned. The record is voluminotb 
as is the number and content of the exhibits. All of the 
evidence which both parties attempted to put in wa1 
received and considered by the Court and jury. 
Throughout the trial many references were made by 
the Court and by counsel to the contract documents ana 
1
1 
to the issues involved. Extensive argument was had. , 
although it is not reported as part of the record. Appel·, 
lants put on much evidence relating to the allegeo, 
delays to Cox's work and to alleged damages suffered, 
by Cox. The Court and the jury after considering sucli ' 
claims found them to have no merit. Respondent' 
'Veyher, put on extensive evidence relative to dela! 
and to the damages suffered. The Court and jury found 1 
merit in only some of the damages of plaintiff but diJ 
find merit in the plaintiff's position as to the delayi 
The jury did come back in one instance to ask a ques· 
tion but were satisfied in all other respects. Appellanb 
I 
have shown nothing which would indicate any reversai 
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1rnnld have resulted if different Instructions had been 
given, The Instructions although brief were more than 
adequate when considered in light of the extensive evi-
dence and argument which was presented throughout 
the trial. 
SUMMARY 
Appellants seek relief in this case upon three grounds, 
none of which can be supported by the record. There 
is nothing to indicate, either in the record or in appel-
lants' Brief, that W eyher could be liable to Cox for the 
claimed delay. Furthermore, appellants have not taken 
issue with the determination by the Court and jury 
that Cox's claim for delay and damages is untenable. 
The Court and jury considered appellants' claim for 
costs and found no merit therein. To grant a further 
hearing under Point III of appellants' claimed relief 
u1 order to determine the amount of damage suffered 
by Cox would be contrary to the Findings of the Court, 
and appellants in this case have not questioned the 
determination by the Court that Cox's claim is un-
founded. 
All three Points upon which appellants rely, how-
eYer, are sufficiently laid at rest by answering the two 
questions affirmatively: (a) Was the evidence suffi-
cient to support the jury's findings; and (b) were the 
Instructions given properly so that prejudicial error 
was not committed by the Court? 'Ve believe that the 
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record fully supports the jury's answers to the Special 
Interrogatories and the Court's Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Judgment. Respondent respect. 
fully petitions this Court that the jury's Special Verdict 
I 
the Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT 
By -···-··-····························--···-·············· 
Elliott Lee Pratt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
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